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Abstract 
The question “What is the meaning of life?” is longstanding and important, but has been shunned by 
philosophers for decades. Instead, contemporary philosophers have focused on other questions, such 
as “What gives meaning to the life of a person?” According to James Tartaglia, this research on 
“meaning in life” is shallow and pointless. He urges philosophers to redirect their attention back to 
the fundamental question about “meaning of life.” Tartaglia argues that humanity was not created for 
a purpose and, therefore, is meaningless. He assumes that humanity could not be meaningful unless 
we were created for a purpose. I will outline a different way that humanity could become meaningful. 
In addition, I will explain how the research on “meaning in life” is important for understanding how 




We live our lives, expending great effort to remain alive and achieve our goals, 
without knowing whether human life is meaningful. Laypeople often assume that 
philosophers seek to answer the question “What is the meaning of life?”1 Actually, 
only a small number of philosophers give attention to questions about the meaning 
of life.2 And when they reflect on these questions, they typically do so from a 
theistic perspective – a view that many people no longer find credible. I will 
examine these questions from a naturalistic perspective.  
In recent years, there has been a growing interest among philosophers in the 
topic of meaningfulness. However, instead of focusing on the traditional questions 
about meaning of life that preoccupied existentialists, contemporary philosophers 
strive to explain what gives meaning to the life of a person. They refer to this 
latter topic as “meaning in life” to distinguish it from questions about the 
“meaning of human life” in general. Susan Wolf and Thaddeus Metz – leading 
                                                     
* Independent scholar. Email: triselba[a]cs.com. 
** I would like to thank Editor-in-chief Masahiro Morioka for inviting me to contribute to this issue. 
1 Laypeople often also assume that philosophy is “all about” the meaning of life. Tartaglia (2016b) 
argues for this view.   
2 See, for example, Cottingham (2003), Cooper (2005), and Seachris (2009).  
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figures in this research – have each proposed a theory of meaning in life.3 These 
theories support objective naturalism – the view that one accrues meaning in one’s 
life by engaging with inherently valuable and natural, mind-independent goods.  
James Tartaglia is harshly critical of this work by these philosophers. He 
contends that this research is shallow,4 pointless,5 and can be misleading.6 He 
argues that there is nothing philosophical about identifying what makes a person’s 
life more meaningful.7 He seems to think that one can find this in a self-help book.  
Regarding the topic of meaningfulness, Tartaglia claims that there is only one 
truly important question: “[W]hat are we here for?”8 This focus on “meaning in 
life” has diverted our attention from this question, he argues. Tartaglia 
acknowledges that there is meaning in life – what he refers to as “social meaning.” 
However, he argues that human life was not created for a purpose and, therefore, 
is meaningless. 
 “Life” can refer to a human being or all of humanity, which can lead to 
confusion in this debate about meaningfulness. Take, for example, the title of 
Tartaglia’s book: Philosophy in a Meaningless Life. With this title, some potential 
readers might assume that the book is about the life of a person. However, in 
reading the book, it quickly becomes clear that Tartaglia is referring to human life, 
as a whole.   
As with “life,” “humanity” can be thought of in multiple ways. Humanity can 
be conceived as a whole or as the many individuals that make up the whole.9 
These two different metaphysical conceptions of humanity give rise to two 
different ways of thinking about how humanity could be meaningful. With the 
traditional, holistic account of meaning of life, a meaning of life is conceived as 
a meaning that is possessed by humanity, as a whole. There is, however, an 
alternative, individualistic conception of meaning of life that I will outline. By 
engaging with inherently valuable and natural goods, it adds meaning to our 
individual lives, which in turn adds meaning to humanity from the “bottom-up,” 
as I will hypothesize.10  
                                                     
3 See Wolf (2010) and Metz (2013). 
4 Tartaglia (2016a), p. 4. 
5 Ibid., p. 16.  
6 Tartaglia (2015), p. 98 and (2016a), p. 1.  
7 Tartaglia (2015), pp. 95, 102 and (2016a), pp. 4, 16. See Metz (2016a) for his response to the 
criticisms by Tartaglia and others.  
8 Tartaglia (2016a), p. 2. 
9 I will use the terms “humanity” and “human life” interchangeably.  
10 I initially discussed this view in Trisel (2016). I further develop this view in this paper.  
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In the next section, I will provide an overview of Tartaglia’s nihilism. Many 
people, including Tartaglia, assume that humanity could not be meaningful unless 
we were created for a purpose. In section three, I will seek to demonstrate that this 
assumption is false. Then, in section four, I will compare the holistic and 
individualistic accounts of how humanity could be meaningful and will point out 
some problems with Tartaglia’s holistic account. In section five, I will advocate 
for the individualistic account. In addition, I will explain how the research on 
“meaning in life” is important for understanding how humanity could become 
meaningful.  
 
2. An Overview of Tartaglia’s Nihilism 
 
In the social framework in which we live our lives, there are pre-existing 
traditions, organizations, and fields of endeavor that one can join, as Tartaglia 
indicates.11 Our individual activities can be meaningful because they are situated 
within the context of meaning provided by the social framework. Likewise, for 
human life, as a whole, to be meaningful, it must exist within a wider context of 
meaning, Tartaglia argues. Tartaglia claims that the physical universe does not 
provide life with a context of meaning. Therefore, he contends that a 
“transcendent context of meaning” is necessary for life to be meaningful.12  
Tartaglia hypothesizes that consciousness transcends the objective world. If 
true, this opens up a possibility that reality transcends the physical universe, he 
argues.13  
Tartaglia indicates that if humanity were created for a purpose by a 
transcendent context of meaning, “We might be here to do something, and so 
discovering the reason might persuade us to change our lives.”14 Alternatively, 
“the meaning of our lives might consist in being valuable, rather than having the 
capacity for doing something valuable.”15 However, he later concludes, “even if 
the physical universe does exist within a transcendent context, there is no reason 
this should be a context of meaning, or one in which human life has an overall 
purpose. All this is possible, but possibility is cheap.”16  
                                                     
11 Tartaglia (2016a), pp. 22-23. 
12 Ibid., p. 48. 
13 Ibid., pp. 10-11, 85-86.  
14 Ibid., p. 2. 
15 Ibid., p. 2. 
16 Ibid., p. 52 (emphasis in original). 
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Despite its negative connotations, Tartaglia adopts “nihilism” as the name for 
his view that human life is meaningless.17 Contrary to some nihilists, Tartaglia 
does not deny that there are values or objective truths. In fact, he claims that 
existential nihilism is an objective truth.18  
Within the social framework, people pursue various goals such as to graduate 
from college, get married, and have children, but these goals are nothing more 
than “socially constructed impositions upon life . . . ,” Tartaglia argues. 19 
Although our goals can seem like absolute imperatives, when we step outside of 
the social framework, we see that every human goal is “optional and ultimately 
pointless,” according to Tartaglia.20    
Tartaglia expresses admiration for the religious-based way in which John 
Cottingham and Joshua Seachris have analyzed questions about life’s meaning.21 
In contrast, Tartaglia does not discuss the characteristics of his envisioned 
“transcendent context of meaning” or use the words “God” or “transcendent 
being.” Rather, he tries to distance his view from theistic accounts of 
transcendence. For example, he argues, “there is no need to associate 
transcendence with religious meaning . . . .”22  
The transcendent context of meaning, as imagined by Tartaglia, has the ability 
to create the universe and human life for a purpose. To have this ability, it would 
be necessary for the “transcendent context of meaning” to think, plan, and have a 
goal(s). Thus, although Tartaglia does not mention “God” or a “transcendent 
being,” I will sometimes refer to his envisioned “transcendent context of meaning” 
as a “transcendent being.”  
Tartaglia’s argument that life is meaningless, in the absence of a transcendent 
context of meaning, is similar to the argument made by some theists, such as 
William Lane Craig, who contend that life without God would be meaningless.23 
However, unlike Craig, Tartaglia does not think that nihilism is “bad.”24 He 
thinks it is just a “neutral fact.”25 Tartaglia is adamant that nihilism will not lead 
                                                     
17 Ibid., pp. 6-7.  
18 Ibid., pp. 57-60.  
19 Ibid., p. 23.  
20 Ibid., p. 27.  
21 Ibid., on p. 19, Tartaglia discusses Cottingham (2003) and Seachris (2013a). 
22 Ibid., p. 170. 
23 See Craig (2000). 
24 Tartaglia (2016a), pp. 5-6. Another difference between the views of Tartaglia and Craig is that Craig 
maintains that God and personal immortality are both necessary for life to be meaningful. Tartaglia 
does not discuss personal immortality.  
25 Ibid., p. ix.  
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us to give up on, or care less about, our projects, activities, and relationships 
because when we realize there is no purpose of life, we will then step back into 
the social framework and reengage with our goals.26  
   
3. Why Transcendence is Unnecessary for Humanity to be Meaningful 
 
Tartaglia argues that the famous question, “What is the meaning of life?” boils 
down to the question “[W]hat are we here for?”27 I disagree. This latter question 
is too narrowly focused to serve as a guide in our search for a meaning of life. As 
philosophers have long recognized, there is an amalgam of questions about 
meaning of life, including the question “What makes life valuable?”28 This latter 
question holds out the possibility that human life could be meaningful and 
valuable regardless of whether it was created for a purpose.   
The universe does not exist for a purpose and, therefore, human life does not 
exist within a wider, context of meaning, Tartaglia contends. Tartaglia uses the 
phrase “context of meaning,” in an overly narrow way, to mean a context that has 
a purpose. As I will argue, the universe provides human life with a context of 
meaning despite whether the universe was created for a purpose or is inherently 
purposeful.  
By comparing the universe to other contexts that would be unsupportive of 
leading meaningful lives, as I will do, it becomes clear that the universe provides 
human life with a context of meaning. There are different ways that a context 
could be unsupportive of human flourishing. First, there might be a zero 
probability that intelligent life would originate in the context. Second, the context 
might be habitable to intelligent life, but the nature of that context might prevent 
one from engaging in meaning-conferring activities. For example, the species 
might have to spend all of its time searching for food and shelter and have no time 
left for meaningful activities. Alternatively, the species might have time to create 
things of value, such as artwork, but these things might disintegrate as soon as 
they are created.   
We naturally emerged in this universe and it unknowingly nourishes and 
sustains us. Although the things we create do not last forever, they generally last 
                                                     
26 Ibid., pp. 43, 175. In contrast, Kahane (2016) argues that belief in nihilism would have detrimental 
consequences.      
27 Ibid., pp. 1-2. 
28 See, for example, Hepburn (2000), pp. 261-276. For more discussion about the “amalgam thesis,” 
see Seachris (2013b), pp. 9-10.  
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long enough for them to enrich our lives. The universe has given rise to some 
intrinsically valuable goods. Goods often mentioned by objectivists include 
knowledge, autonomy, loving relationships, achievements, and excellence. By 
pursuing and promoting these and other goods, it adds meaning to our lives, and 
does so regardless of whether there is a transcendent context of meaning.   
Early in his book, Tartaglia argues that a transcendent context of meaning is 
necessary for life to be meaningful. Later, he adds a new requirement - that this 
transcendent context of meaning be a “final context,” which is a context that “does 
not depend for its existence upon another, wider context.”29 He contends that this 
is not an overly strong requirement. Unless the context is final, we could 
disengage from a purpose for which life was created, which would make it merely 
an optional pursuit within life instead of something that is constitutive of life, 
according to Tartaglia. He indicates that the purpose “would have to be something 
that determines the significance of our behaviour whether we like it or not . . . it 
would be like a game we could not stop playing.”30  
Under these conditions, it becomes difficult to see how we could have free 
will. Even if the purpose was not worth our efforts or evil, we could not stop 
implementing it.  
If the purpose would have to “determine the significance” of our behavior, as 
Tartaglia indicates, does this mean that we could not make any decisions on our 
own? Alternatively, does it mean that we could make some decisions, but that 
these decisions could be overridden? For example, if you want to spend time with 
a loved one, could the purpose or transcendent being override your decision and 
force you to do something else instead? As Robert Nozick indicated, “Without 
free will we seem diminished, merely the playthings of external causes. Our value 
seems undercut.”31  
Kurt Baier, in a well-known lecture, argued that having a purpose imposed 
upon us by a superior being would be degrading. He writes, “If . . . I ask a man . . . 
‘What is your purpose?’ I am insulting him. I might as well have asked, ‘What are 
you for?’ Such questions reduce him to the level of a gadget, a domestic animal, 
or perhaps a slave.”32 In response, Metz has argued that it would not necessarily 
be disrespectful for God to have assigned human life a purpose.33 If God assigned 
                                                     
29 Tartaglia (2016a), p. 49. 
30 Ibid., p. 49. 
31 Nozick (1981), p. 2. See also discussion by Fischer (2005). 
32 Baier (2000), p. 120. 
33 Metz (2000), pp. 297-300 and (2013), pp. 102-103.  
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the purpose as a request rather than a command, then this need not be degrading. 
I believe this is correct. However, having a purpose imposed upon us in the 
controlling way that Tartaglia envisions would be degrading.  
Tartaglia compares a meaning of life to the possibility of achieving checkmate 
in chess. He seems disappointed that human life does not have a purpose, as does 
a game of chess. Under the conditions that Tartaglia claims are necessary for life 
to be meaningful, human beings would be like the pawns in the game of chess. 
Even if we achieved the purpose for which we were created, because our actions 
were predetermined, or at least heavily influenced, this achievement would not be 
our own. Rather, it would be an achievement by the transcendent being.  
Some people feel threatened by the thought that life arose through chance. For 
example, Craig argues that, if the universe and humanity arose through chance, 
“Man is just a lump of slime that evolved into rationality.”34 If life originated by 
chance, this suggests that life was unintended and that it was contingent, meaning 
that there was a possibility it might never have come into existence. Craig and 
Tartaglia falsely assume that being created for a purpose by a transcendent being 
is the only way that humanity could be meaningful. There is, however, another 
pathway by which humanity could be meaningful. By engaging with the 
intrinsically valuable goods in the universe, it adds meaning to our individual lives, 
which in turn adds meaning to humanity.  
Tartaglia acknowledges that our individual lives are “contingently valuable.” 
He writes, “For although our nature is not intrinsically valuable, we value many 
things, including ourselves. We might not have done so, so this value is not 
essential to what we are, or to the other things we value.”35 He laments that value 
“does not flow inevitably from our nature . . . .”36 Tartaglia assumes that if there 
were a transcendent context of meaning, and if this context explained why we 
exist, that this would somehow make human life inevitably valuable. However, 
this is a false assumption because even if human life were created for a worthy 
purpose by a transcendent being, human life would still be contingently valuable 
because the transcendent being could have decided not to create us.37   
Why do some people want human life to have been inevitable? They think 
that being inevitable would make life valuable, but this is not necessarily true. 
                                                     
34 Craig (2000), p. 45. Tartaglia (2016a) discusses contingency on p. 50.  
35 Tartaglia (2016a), p. 6. 
36 Ibid., p. 6. 
37 For earlier discussion about contingency, see Trisel (2012b) and Metz (2013), pp. 83-84. Seachris 
(2013a, p. 609) acknowledges that humanity is contingent from the perspective of Christianity.  
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Consider, for example, bedbugs – an insect that feeds on blood. Even if the 
universe was non-contingent, such as being infinitely old, and it was inevitable 
that bedbugs would arise in this universe, bedbugs would still not be valuable.  
Early in his book, Tartaglia asserts that the hypothesis of a transcendent 
meaning is “worthy of faith,”38 but later he discards this hypothesis because it is 
too remote of a possibility to be taken seriously.39 There is an additional reason 
to reject the hypothesis that humanity was created by a transcendent being to “do 
something.” If humanity had been created to carry out a purpose, our role would 
have been revealed to us long ago. It would be self-defeating for a transcendent 
being to give humanity a role in carrying out a purpose, but then not reveal our 
role to us.40 This would be like a person creating a business and hiring workers, 
but then failing to tell them the mission of the business and their role. It is the stuff 
of comedy to imagine these workers being bored to tears, while the business 
owner sobs loudly after learning that the business is losing money. Of course, no 
competent owner of a business would fail to tell the workers what they were hired 
“to do” because failing to provide this essential information would be self-
defeating.  
To sum up this section, the universe provides human life with a context of 
meaning by having given rise to intelligent life, by unknowingly sustaining us, 
and by containing intrinsically valuable goods. By engaging with these goods, it 
adds meaning to our individual lives and to humanity. This outcome occurs 
regardless of whether the universe and humanity were created for a purpose by a 
transcendent context of meaning. Not only is a transcendent purpose unnecessary 
for our lives to be meaningful, the one envisioned by Tartaglia would be degrading.  
In response, Tartaglia will likely argue that I have not addressed the questions 
about “meaning of life,” but have only shown that our individual lives can be 
meaningful - something he does not dispute. Tartaglia wants us to focus on the 
question “What is the meaning of life?” where “life” refers to “humanity.” But to 
know whether humanity is, or can be, meaningful, we must first answer the 
fundamental question of “What is humanity?” The answer to this question might 
seem obvious, which likely explains why the question has not been explored. 
However, as I hope to show in the next section, the answer to this question is not 
obvious, and is one of the keys for unlocking the mystery of whether human life 
                                                     
38 Tartaglia (2016a), p. 53. 
39 Ibid., pp. 169-184. 
40 I provide a more detailed version of this argument in Trisel (2012a).  
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is, or can be, meaningful.    
 
4. What is Humanity? – Holism versus Individualism 
 
Bertrand Russell made a distinction between a class as a whole and a class as 
many. For example, we can think of a navy as a whole or as many sailors, as he 
indicated.41 As I will argue, we can also think of “humanity” as one or many. 
More specifically, Tartaglia (and most other people I suspect) thinks of humanity 
as a whole - a perspective I will refer to as holism. We can also conceive of 
humanity as the many, individual human beings that make up the whole – a 
perspective I will refer to as individualism.   
Before exploring the question “What is humanity?” it will be helpful to start 
with a discussion of a group that is easier to understand – the New York Yankees 
(hereafter “Yankees”). If we imagine we are watching a Yankees baseball game, 
we see the individual players, bats, and ball. It is uncontroversial that these 
concrete objects exist. But does the Yankees, as a group, also exist?42 Some 
proponents of ontological individualism deny that groups exist.43 Thus, they will 
deny that the Yankees, as a group, won the World Series in 2009.   
Many philosophers believe in the reality of groups. Even if we assume that 
the Yankees, as a group, exist, there are two different ways of explaining their 
achievement of winning the World Series. Methodological holists will argue that 
this group achievement was more than the sum of the achievements by the 
individual players because of the synergistic effects of the players working 
together. In contrast, proponents of methodological individualism will maintain 
that this achievement was nothing more than the sum of the individual 
achievements.  
Individuals can have rights, be blameworthy or praiseworthy, and be bearers 
of meaning. Can groups do the same? There has been extensive analysis of 
whether groups can have rights and be blameworthy, but there has been very little 
discussion about whether groups can be praiseworthy and meaningful.    
Do human beings constitute a group? If so, what type of group is it? Katherine 
                                                     
41 Russell (1903), p. 68. Ritchie (2013, p. 258) makes the case that a group, like a class, can be 
thought of as one or many. 
42 For further discussion, see Ritchie (2013) .  
43 Other proponents of ontological individualism acknowledge that groups exist, but maintain that 
groups and other social phenomena are exhaustively determined by properties or facts about 
individuals.  
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Ritchie outlines various criteria for determining what qualifies as a “social 
group.”44 Some of these criteria include that a social group can be located in space 
and time and have different members at different times. Because other objects, 
such as trees, also meet most of the criteria she specifies, Ritchie adds the 
requirement that the members intended to form the group. In a later article, Ritchie 
distinguishes between “organized” and “unorganized” social groups. Whereas the 
members of organized social groups, such as committees, need to cooperate to 
achieve the goal(s) of the group, the members of unorganized social groups, such 
as racial and gender groups, “do not need to intend to cooperate or act in concord 
with other members of the group.”45   
One might try to argue that all human beings have shared intentions and, 
therefore, qualify as an “organized social group.” This argument, however, would 
be a stretch. Unlike the members of organized social groups, not all human beings 
have a shared goal. Indeed, some people have conflicting goals.  
It seems plausible that human beings constitute an “unorganized social group.” 
Another option would be to conceive of human beings in the same way as 
biologists - as a species. But this might not get us very far in understanding the 
ontology of humanity because it leads to another, unresolved question: “What is 
a species and how do you distinguish one species from another?”46 Because there 
is vigorous debate about the ontological status of social groups and species, more 
work will be needed to determine whether human beings make up a group and, if 
so, what type of group it is. I raise these questions about the ontology of humanity, 
and hope others will join me in exploring them, because addressing these 
questions is necessary for understanding whether it makes sense to think that 
humanity could be meaningful. In what follows, I will assume that human beings 
are an “unorganized social group” and that such a group can be a bearer of 
meaning.  
Tartaglia thinks of a meaning of life as a meaning that is possessed by 
humanity, as a whole.47 If we think of “humanity,” not in the traditional holistic 
way, but as the many individuals that comprise the group, it reveals a different 
way that humanity could become meaningful. As I will argue, when individuals 
accrue meaning in their lives, by, for example, making intellectual or moral 
                                                     
44 Ritchie (2013), pp. 258-260. 
45 Ritchie (2015), pp. 313-314.  
46 For further discussion about this question, see Ereshefsky (2016).  
47 Targalia (2016a), p. 54. 
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achievements, this also adds meaning to humanity. As more individual lives 
become meaningful, there is a corresponding increase in the meaning of human 
life. Irving Singer made a few comments suggesting that he also believed that 
humanity could become meaningful through the efforts of individual human 
beings. He writes: “To the extent that life becomes meaningful in this 
accumulative way, its total meaning is increased.”48 The two perspectives of how 
humanity could be meaningful are as follows.  
 
Meaning of Life – Holism: A meaning of life is a meaning possessed by 
humanity, as a group, rather than by individual human beings.   
 
Meaning of Life – Individualism: A meaning of life is a meaning that 
humanity accrues as individual human beings engage with intrinsically 
valuable goods. This meaning is equal to the sum of the meaning in the 
lives of individual human beings.  
 
There could be holistic or individualistic versions of supernaturalism 49  and 
naturalism. For example, with the traditional view of supernaturalistic holism (as 
I will call it), God assigns the same purpose(s) to everyone. In contrast, Jacob 
Affolter suggests that God could assign each person a unique purpose.50 He does 
not argue that these unique purposes need to be related. Affolter’s view 
exemplifies supernaturalistic individualism. 
In the next section, I will seek to support a naturalistic and individualistic 
account of meaning of life, which I will call “naturalistic individualism.” Before 
doing so, I will point out some problems that arise with Tartaglia’s version of 
supernaturalistic holism. According to Tartaglia, “if you ask about the meaning of 
life, the answer will apply to everybody . . . .”51 When thinking about whether 
humanity was created for a purpose, we must keep in mind that “humanity” is not 
something that exists independently of human beings. Rather, humanity is 
comprised of individual human beings. Furthermore, the members of humanity 
are not static, but change over time, as new human beings are born and existing 
human beings die. With this in mind, suppose that a transcendent being created 
                                                     
48 Singer (1996), p. 42. See also pp. 44-45.  
49 For more discussion about supernaturalism, see Metz (2013), pp. 77-118. 
50 Affolter (2007), p. 453. 
51 Tartaglia (2015), p. 93. See also (2016a), p. 7. 
 171
the universe and wanted to see if intelligent life could be created from matter. The 
transcendent being successfully created the first two human beings – a man and a 
woman. Let us also suppose that these two individuals were not created to “do 
something” and that the transcendent being was indifferent to whether they had 
children. These two individuals lived for 60 years and had many children who, in 
turn, had additional offspring. After 200,000 years, humanity consisted of seven 
billion people, let us suppose. To state it formally: 
 
At t1, humanity was comprised of two members who were created for a 
purpose by a transcendent being.  
 
At t200,000, humanity was comprised of seven billion members who were not  
created for a purpose by a transcendent being.  
 
Tartaglia claims that whether human life is meaningful will apply to “everybody,” 
but in the above scenario, where only the first two members of humanity were 
created for a purpose by a transcendent being, it is unclear that this is true. Is 
humanity, as a whole, meaningful or meaningless in this scenario? It would be 
helpful if Tartaglia would let us know the answer to this question.  
In the following different scenario, suppose that a transcendent being created 
all human beings to “do something.” Suppose also that this transcendent being 
made our role clear to us, but that only 20% of people contributed toward 
implementing the purpose. The remaining 80% of human beings disregarded the 
purpose and spent all their time watching television. In this scenario, where only 
20% of people contribute, is humanity meaningful or meaningless? If humanity is 
meaningless, what level of participation by human beings would be required for 
humanity to be meaningful? Would 51% of human beings have to contribute to 
the purpose or would the percentage have to be 80% or 100%? Where do you draw 
the line and how do you defend, in a non-arbitrary way, where it is drawn? 
At first, the holistic account might seem appealing because of its simplicity at 
conceiving of human life, as a whole, as either possessing or lacking meaning. 
However, as shown by the preceding thought experiment, this simplicity quickly 
disappears as we think more deeply about what humanity is and how human 
beings, with our freedom and diverse interests, would carry out an assigned 
purpose. Tartaglia might respond that the above situation would not happen 
because human beings would be unable to disengage from the purpose (in the 
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scenario he envisions). But if our actions are predetermined, or everyone is forced 
to implement this purpose, it then becomes difficult to see how this would confer 
meaning on humanity.  
 
5. Researching Meaning of Life from the Bottom-up 
 
In discussing “What is philosophy?” Tartaglia contends that philosophy was 
originally motivated by questions of ontology and enframement; “we wanted to 
know what exists and why it exists.”52 He uses the word “enframement” to mean 
being situated within a context of meaning. In recounting the history of philosophy, 
Tartaglia argues that to determine whether there is a meaning of life, “a natural 
place to start is with the ontological question of whether there are any gods to 
provide a wider framework within which human life exists.”53   
This “top-down” approach, as I will call it, to researching questions about 
meaning of life has proven to be unsuccessful. For thousands of years, there has 
been speculation and discussion about gods and transcendence, yet human beings 
have made little progress in understanding the questions about meaning of life. 
Instead of continuing the top-down approach to researching the topic of meaning 
of life, we would be better served with a new, bottom-up approach.   
From the perspective of naturalistic individualism, the source of life’s meaning 
is not a supernatural being, but the interaction between individual human beings 
and intrinsically valuable, natural goods. By explaining what gives meaning to the 
life of a person, the philosophical and psychological research that has been 
conducted during the last thirty years provides a good starting point for a bottom-
up approach to researching meaning of life. Besides continuing this research on 
“meaning in life,” an additional necessary step for a bottom-up approach would 
be to determine whether the meaning that we accrue in our individual lives can 
serve as a foundation for making humanity meaningful, as I hypothesize.   
With naturalistic individualism, the extent to which humanity is meaningful 
equals the sum of the meaning in the lives of individual human beings. For this 
proposed account to be plausible, (1) meaning must be measurable; (2) meaning 
must be comparable among individuals; (3) human beings must constitute a 
group; and (4) this type of group must be capable of being a bearer of meaning.  
If meaning cannot be measured, then of course it cannot be aggregated. If 
                                                     
52 Tartaglia (2016a), p. 71.  
53 Ibid., p. 71.  
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meaning is measurable, but not comparable among individuals, then it could be 
aggregated, but the aggregate number would be unintelligible - it would be like 
adding apples and oranges. Finally, if meaning is measurable and comparable, but 
human beings do not make up a group, or are a group but this group is not a bearer 
of meaning, then the aggregate number would not represent the extent to which 
humanity is meaningful. Rather, it would simply be the sum of the meaning in our 
individual lives. Similarly, if there are no “nations” in this world, but only persons, 
it would be inappropriate to conclude that the sum of the wealth of persons in a 
particular geographic area reflects the wealth of a given “nation.”  
There is debate about which metric(s) we should use to assess the quality of 
our lives. Recently, researchers have begun to measure “subjective well-being” in 
addition to, or sometimes instead of, happiness. For example, although the World 
Happiness Report contains happiness in the title, it is a report about “subjective 
well-being,” as the report acknowledges. The report compares the degree of 
subjective well-being by country.54 In this study, the primary question to measure 
well-being is as follows. Imagine a ladder with 10 possible steps, with the bottom 
step representing the worst possible life for you and the top step representing the 
best possible life for you. “On which step of the ladder would you say you 
personally feel you stand at this time?”55 
The data source for this “life ladder” question is the Gallup World Poll. Gallup 
conducts this poll in more than 160 countries that include 99% of the world’s adult 
population. They select a representative sample of about 1,000 individuals from 
each country so that the results will be generalizable to the various countries.  
Amitai Etzioni argues that happiness and subjective well-being are inferior 
measures because they fail to take into account whether people are living up to 
their moral responsibilities. 56  In response, Metz makes the case that 
meaningfulness should be included as one of the metrics for appraising a society 
because it is not reducible to happiness or morality.57 But is meaningfulness 
something that we can measure and compare?  
To reflect on the preceding question, it might be helpful to list the different 
aspects that are involved in measuring subjective well-being, as I will do in the 
                                                     
54 See Helliwell (2015), p. 26.  
55 A discussion of the survey methodology can be found in the “Statistical Appendix” at  
<http://worldhappiness.report/ed/2015/> or at <http://www.gallup.com/178667/gallup-world-poll-
work.aspx>. 
56 Etzioni (2016). 
57 Metz (2016b).  
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table below, and then to think about these aspects as they relate to meaningfulness. 
First, we can ask, “Who is being evaluated?” With the Gallup World Poll, those 
being evaluated include the respondents to the survey and each country. Although 
Gallup conducts the interviews, the respondents rate their own subjective well-
being. Thus, these are internal or self-evaluations of well-being, rather than an 
external evaluation of the participants in the study.58 If Gallup were to ask the 
question, “Is your life going well?” this question would have only two possible 
answers: “yes” and “no.” It would be a binary variable. Rather, their “life ladder” 
question reflects the assumption that there are degrees of well-being. Thus, they 
treat well-being as an ordinal variable.  
 
Aspects of Measuring Subjective Well-Being 
Who is Being Evaluated? Individual Respondents to the Survey and 
the Countries in Which They Reside 
Who Performs the 
Evaluation? 
Self-Evaluation 
Type of Measure Subjective 
Is the Measure Binary or 
Ordinal? 
“Life ladder” question is ordinal 
  
Measuring meaningfulness is more controversial than measuring happiness or 
subjective well-being. There is debate about what meaning is, whether it is 
objective or subjective, and whether meaning is something that is present or 
absent or whether there are degrees of meaningfulness. There is also debate about 
how meaningfulness should be measured, namely whether it should be measured 
internally or externally.  
Metz, with his “fundamentality theory,” hypothesizes that one’s life is more 
meaningful, the more that one orients one’s rationality toward fundamental 
conditions of human existence.59 Some critics of this theory, including Masahiro 
Morioka, deny that there are degrees of meaningfulness and that it is possible to 
make interpersonal comparisons of meaning. Morioka has proposed an internalist 
account of meaning in life. He argues that the question about meaning in life is 
often asked in the following way, “does my life like this have any meaning at 
                                                     
58 See Helliwell (2015, pp. 17-20) for discussion about why they measure well-being internally rather 
than externally.  
59 Metz (2013).  
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all?”60 He contends that this question has only two possible responses (“yes” and 
“no”) and can be answered only by the person who asks the question. 
Even if meaning is binary and not objective, it would still be possible to make 
some interpersonal comparisons of meaningfulness. For example, one could 
calculate the number and percent of people living in a country who self-report that 
their lives are meaningful. However, because these individuals might have 
different conceptions of “meaningfulness,” these results would be less useful, 
from a policymaking perspective, than they would be if meaning were objective.  
If we knew whether meaning was objective (as I believe) or subjective, it 
would help to determine how we should measure meaningfulness. For example, 
if meaning is purely subjective, then the person being evaluated would be in the 
best position to know whether his or her life is meaningful. Alternatively, if 
meaning is objective, then one could be mistaken about whether one’s life is 
meaningful. Consequently, this would lend support to those philosophers who 
think meaningfulness should be measured using mind-independent, external 
standards.  
Tartaglia argues that there are four different notions of “meaning” and that 
meaningfulness is culturally specific.61 Unless there is a way of resolving these 
disputes about the nature of “meaning,” this will pose a serious threat to the 
prospect of measuring meaningfulness. Because we are at an early stage of 
analyzing what it means to say that a person’s life is meaningful, I remain hopeful 
that we will be able to work through these issues.  
If it turns out that meaning is objective, measurable, and comparable among 
individuals, then it would be possible to aggregate this meaning and to have 
confidence that the aggregate number is intelligible. Moreover, if human beings 
constitute an “unorganized social group,” and this type of group can be a bearer 
of meaning, then the sum of the meaning in our individual lives would represent 
the extent to which humanity is meaningful.    
One way that critics will challenge these claims is by attempting to raise doubt 
that an “unorganized social group” could be meaningful. That human beings 
constitute an unorganized social group does not mean there is no cooperation 
among human beings. Rather, it only means that not all members of humanity 
have a shared goal. However, many human beings do have shared goals, such as 
the teams of scientists who are researching a cure for cancer. Let us compare two 
                                                     
60 Morioka (2015), p. 55. 
61 Tartaglia (2015), pp. 103-106. See also Tartaglia (2016a), p. 14.  
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scenarios. The first scenario reflects the current state of our lives. The second 
scenario reflects our current lives with the following changes: human beings have 
discovered how life originated, have attained an understanding of how 
consciousness arises in human beings, and have recently discovered a cure for all 
types of cancer. Even if human beings are an “unorganized social group,” it seems 
to make sense to say that humanity is more meaningful in the second scenario 
than in the first. 
I suspect that Tartaglia will be unconvinced that accruing meaning in our 
individual lives can provide a foundation for making humanity meaningful. He 
will likely maintain that humanity is meaningless no matter what we do in our 
lives. Tartaglia’s claim that humanity is meaningless is based on the hidden 
assumption that human beings make up a group and that this group had the 
potential to be meaningful (if it had been created for a purpose by a transcendent 
being). If human beings do not make up a group that has the potential to be 
meaningful, then claiming that “humanity” is “meaningful” or “meaningless” 
would be nonsensical. Furthermore, under these conditions, it would be irrational 
for anyone to worry that “humanity” is meaningless.   
Let us now return to discussing naturalistic individualism. I will conclude this 
section by responding to a potential, different criticism of this proposed account 
of meaning of life. One might argue that this account implies that we should 
maximize the meaning of human life. This account leads, a critic will argue, to the 
counterintuitive conclusion that we should create billions upon billions of future 
people, even if their lives would only have a tiny amount of meaning in them. 
Because the meaning of human life is an aggregation of the meaning in the lives 
of human beings, creating vast numbers of new human beings would make 
humanity much more meaningful than it currently is. However, this conclusion is 
repugnant because the lives of these new persons might only have a negligible 
amount of meaning in them.62  
The universe, as a context of meaning, unknowingly supports our desire to 
lead meaningful lives, but this support will collapse if we create too many people. 
                                                     
62 See Parfit (1984) for the original formulation of the “Repugnant Conclusion.” He begins by stating 
the “Impersonal Average Principle,” which is, “If other things are equal, the best outcome is the one in 
which people’s lives go, on average, best” (p. 386). He then considers a Hedonistic and a non-
Hedonistic version of this principle. He expresses the non-Hedonistic version in terms of maximizing 
“the quality of lives.” In contrast, I discuss maximizing the meaning in our lives. The concept of a 
“quality life” is more encompassing than that of a “meaningful life,” and takes into account a number 
of factors including the amount of meaning and happiness in that life.  
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Creating vast numbers of new people might make humanity more meaningful in 
the short run, but it would have counterproductive and devastating long-term 
consequences. It would deplete and overwhelm the biosphere and likely result in 
the extinction of humanity and many other forms of life. Thus, if we were to 
pursue the goal of maximizing the meaning of human life, it would need to be 
balanced against the goal of preserving the biosphere.  
There is an alternative, better way of making humanity more meaningful that 
does not involve creating vast numbers of future people. By supporting and 
encouraging existing human beings to engage with intrinsically valuable goods, it 
can help them to realize their potential and lead meaningful lives, which in turn 
will enhance the meaning of human life.    
 
6. Conclusion  
 
Because the topic of “meaning of life,” in recent years, has been 
overshadowed by discussion about “meaning in life,” I found it refreshing to read 
Tartaglia’s works. I disagree, however, with his top-down and narrow approach 
for researching the topic of meaning of life and with his conclusion that human 
life is meaningless. Like Tartaglia, I do not think that life was created for a purpose. 
However, lacking an assigned purpose would not necessarily render human life 
meaningless because there is at least one other way that human life could become 
meaningful.  
I have pointed out two conceptions of humanity, one that focuses on the group, 
as a whole, and one that focuses on the “many human beings” that comprise the 
group. By conceiving of humanity in the individualistic way, and combining this 
individualism with objective naturalism, it reveals a pathway by which humanity 
could become meaningful. It is through the efforts of individuals that a sports team, 
university, nation, or other group is successful. Similarly, it is through the efforts 
of individuals that humanity could become meaningful.  
Finally, I have responded to Tartaglia’s claim that the research on “meaning 
in life” is trivial by explaining how this research is related to understanding how 
humanity could become meaningful. This research is important not only for 
explaining what gives meaning to the life of a person, but for the larger reason of 
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